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A GOOD RULE, POORLY WRITTEN: HOW THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTED THE
INADEQUACY OF IOLTA RATE RULES
Andrew Arthur+
“If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou
shalt not ration justice.”1 This ethos underlies a variety of programs designed to
provide needy Americans with access to the judicial system, including the
IOLTA program.2 IOLTA, an acronym for “Interest on Lawyers’ Trust
Accounts,” is a partnership between banks and the legal community where banks
pay interest on attorneys’ short-term deposit balances held in trust for the
attorneys’ clients.3 Although the interest earned on any particular account may
be insignificant, its impact is magnified when it is aggregated with interest from
IOLTA accounts statewide to fund legal services programs.4 The impact is also
directly influenced by the prevailing interest rates banks pay on IOLTA
balances,5 with minimum rates governed by rules in almost every state.6 Since
+
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Schooner for her insight and expertise in refining the focus of this paper. He would also like to
thank his wife, Praneetha, for her limitless patience and love, and the entire Arthur family for their
constant encouragement and support. Finally, the author owes a debt of gratitude to the members
of the Catholic University Law Review, whose efforts contributed immeasurably to the quality of
this Comment.
1. Thou Shall Not Ration Justice, THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y, http://www.legal-aid.org/
en/las/thoushaltnotrationjustice.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (quoting Honorable Learned Hand,
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 75th Anniversary Address
at the Legal Aid Society of New York (Feb. 16, 1951)).
2. See, e.g., id. see also Kentucky IOLTA Fund, KY. BAR ASS’N, http://www.kybar.org/63
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (illustrating the use of Judge Learned Hand’s quote on an IOLTA
website).
3. See Dru Stevenson, Rethinking IOLTA, 76 MO. L. REV. 455, 456–57 (2011) (discussing
the basic operation of IOLTA programs).
4. Id. at 457; see also What is IOLTA?, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta (last
visited Sept. 18, 2014) (“Without taxing the public, and at no cost to lawyers or their clients, interest
from lawyer trust accounts is pooled to provide civil legal aid to the poor and support improvements
to the justice system.”).
5. See Terry Carter, No Longer Flush IOLTA Programs Find New Funding to Support Legal
Services, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2013, at 61 (“When the Federal Reserve announced in December 2008
that it was lowering the interest rate to virtually zero, it had the effect of nearly zeroing out a
mainstay in funding civil legal services for the poor: interest on lawyers’ trust accounts, aka
IOLTA.”).
6. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(k) (2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
6212(b) (West 2014); FLA. ST. BAR R. 5-1.1(g)(5)(B) (West 2014); MD. CT. R. 16-610(b)(1)(D)(i);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9(c)(1)–(3) (2015); S.C. APP. CT. R. 412(c)(2)(A)–
(B); TEX. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. R. 7(a)(1)–(2) (West 2009); WIS. SUP. CT. R.
20:1.15(cm)(4); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15A(b)(3) (2012).
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its adoption, IOLTA has become a significant part of states’ legal aid program
funding.7
IOLTA came to the United States by way of programs that were first
developed in Canada and Australia over forty years ago.8 In 1981, the Florida
Bar Association Foundation started the first IOLTA program in the United States
and IOLTA programs now exist in every state.9 During its implementation,
however, it faced numerous legal challenges under the Fifth Amendment’s
Taking and Just Compensation clauses.10 Opponents argued that the program
constituted a state taking of interest that rightfully belonged to clients whose
funds were held in trust.11 The Supreme Court settled this issue in Brown v.
Legal Foundation of Washington, holding that IOLTA programs did not violate
the Fifth Amendment.12
With constitutional issues resolved for the time being, the principal legal
authority for IOLTA programs now resides in various state statutes,13 court
rules,14 rules of professional conduct,15 and bar association rules.16 Collectively,
these rules govern the responsibilities of participating attorneys, the reporting
and record-keeping requirements, and the terms of eligibility for banks to
participate as IOLTA depository institutions.17 These eligibility terms include
the requirements that address the rate of interest to be credited to IOLTA
accounts.18 These “comparability” requirements require IOLTA deposits to earn
no less than comparable non-IOLTA deposits or set the required rate at a certain

7. See Stevenson, supra note 3 at 458–59 (stating that IOLTA programs “generat[e] $150250 million every year for legal aid agencies across the nation”) (footnote omitted).
8. IOLTA History, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta/iolta-history (last visited
Sept. 18, 2014).
9. Id.
10. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 466 (2010) (discussing appellate court challenges to
IOLTA).
11. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1998).
12. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003) (agreeing with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “‘[t]here was . . . no constitutional violation
when’” the petitioners did not receive the interest from the money placed in IOLTA accounts
“‘[b]ecause of the way the IOLTA program operates, the compensation due [the petitioners] for
any taking of their property would be nil.’” (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of
Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 861 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Legal Found. of
Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003))).
13. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.10 (West 2014); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 21, § 7000.9 (2015).
14. See, e.g., HAW. SUP. CT. R. 11.
15. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2012).
16. See, e.g., N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2014).
17. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(k).
18. See infra Part I.B.
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percentage of the Federal Funds Target Rate (FFTR).19 The FFTR is set
periodically by the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve.20
Since the beginning of the Financial Crisis in 2007,21 these rate-setting rules
have permitted a decline in interest revenue from IOLTA programs.22 IOLTA
interest rate rules are affected directly or indirectly by the monetary policy of
the Federal Reserve and low central bank interest rates have kept IOLTA rates
at historic lows for a six-year period.23 As a result, legal aid programs that rely
on IOLTA funding continue to face the challenge of seeking other forms of
revenue or reducing the scope of their services to underprivileged citizens in
need of legal services.24
This Comment critically examines how the extraordinary economic
conditions of the Financial Crisis revealed serious inadequacies in the rules that
govern IOLTA interest rates and bank participation, which demonstrates an
unintended negative effect of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy response.
First, this Comment describes IOLTA’s purpose and adoption and examines the
current methods used to set minimum rates. Second, it addresses how
unforeseeable economic conditions and ensuing monetary policy since 2007
have adversely and significantly affected IOLTA program revenues and, in turn,
the administration of legal aid services. Third, this Comment analyzes how the
current rules undermine the purpose of IOLTA and permit inconsistent
participation by banks at the detriment of the IOLTA program and perhaps some
of the banks themselves. Finally, given the ethical imperative for supporting
legal aid programs, this Comment proposes several reforms which would give
teeth to IOLTA rules and ensure the viability and stability of IOLTA revenues
to fund legal aid in future years.

19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See Open Market Operations, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
21. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (“The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 was not
a single event but a series of crises that rippled through the financial system and, ultimately, the
economy.”).
22. Stevenson, supra note 3, at 459 (2010) (“Despite its prevalence and popularity, IOLTA
faces a severe depletion of resources after the 2008 housing and banking crisis.”). According to
Professor Stevenson, IOLTA funding is imperiled by “continuously low interest rates, which lead
to lower amounts of funds collected from IOLTA accounts.” Id. at 458 n.11.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. Carter, supra note 5 (“Some states have tacked on additional court fees, professional fees
and others that are steered to IOLTA programs. Many programs engage in outreach to the bar for
contributions or other ways of steering funds to them.”).
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I. EXAMINING IOLTA RULES AND THEIR IMPACTS DURING THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
A. A Common Purpose, but a Diverse Locus of State Authority
The central purpose of IOLTA is “to increase access to justice for individuals
and families living in poverty and to improve our justice system.” 25 This idea
has been consistently and clearly expressed since it “began in Florida in 1971 as
a result of an investigation into means to provide funds for the improvement of
the administration of justice.”26 In Pennsylvania, for example, today IOLTA
funds provide for the “delivery of civil legal assistance to the poor and
disadvantaged in Pennsylvania by non-profit corporations.”27 Montana’s
IOLTA program sustains missions “[p]roviding legal services, through both paid
staff program(s) and pro bono program(s), to Montana’s low income citizens
who would otherwise be unable to obtain legal assistance; . . . promoting a
knowledge and awareness of the law; and . . . improving the administration of
justice.”28 Aside from costs of administering the fund, Arizona must use IOLTA
revenues to “assist in the delivery of legal services to the poor and law-related
education programs designed to teach young people, educators and other adults
about the law, the legal process and the legal system . . . [and] fund studies or
programs designed to improve the administration of justice.”29 In similar
language across the country, state IOLTA rules express the program’s mandate
to deliver legal aid services to those who cannot afford it.30
Although IOLTA’s purpose is consistent nationwide, individual states have
chosen varying seats of authority to regulate IOLTA programs.31 IOLTA
regulations were primarily incorporated within the respective state rules of
professional conduct regarding the safekeeping of property.32 Other states
govern IOLTA using court rules that mirror standards expressed in the states’
respective rules of professional conduct.33 A small number of states have

25. What is IOLTA?, supra note 4.
26. Petition of N.H. Bar Ass’n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1259 (N.H. 1982).
27. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(s)(1) (2014).
28. MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(a)(1)–(3) (West 2014).
29. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 43(f)(6)(A)–(B).
30. See, e.g., D.C. BAR R. XIV, § 1 (West 2014) (stating that the “fundamental function” of
the IOLTA program is “the support of legal services organizations and administration of justice
programs.”).
31. See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(k) (2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 6212(b) (West 2014); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a)(2) (West 2014); OKLA. ST.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(2) (West 2015); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
1.15(o)(3) (West 2014); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15A (2012).
33. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 43(f); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 11(c)(1)(D)(i); MD. CT. R. 16610(b)(1)(D); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 50(1)(B); VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § 4, para. 20.
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codified IOLTA regulations by statute.34 Still others regulate IOLTA through
state bar rules.35 Regardless of the type of legal authority chosen by each state,
almost every regulation contains language establishing a basis to determine
minimum IOLTA interest rates and banking institution eligibility for
participation.
B. IOLTA Minimum Rate Provisions
1. Rate Comparability Provisions
Included in most states’ IOLTA regulations is a method to calculate the
minimum interest rate that participating banks must pay on IOLTA accounts.36
A minority of states’ rules make no provision for any minimum rate of interest
to be paid.37 However, the majority of state IOLTA rules contain comparability
provisions that ensure IOLTA accounts are eligible to earn interest that is
comparable to non-IOLTA accounts of a similar type.38 Comparability
provisions were not initially common to IOLTA regulations; the Ohio IOLTA
program was the first to implement rate comparability rules, and a majority of
34. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4705.10 (West 2014).
35. See, e.g., FLA. ST. BAR R. 5-1.1(g)–(k) (West 2014); IDAHO BAR. COMM. R. 1306 (West
2014); ME. BAR R. 6(a)(2)–(5) (West 2014); MO. BAR R. 4-1.145 (West 2014); N.C. BAR R. ch. 1,
subch. D., § .1317 (West 2014); UTAH BAR. R. 14-1001 (West 2014).
36. See, e.g., UTAH BAR. R. 14-1001(f).
37. See ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 43(f)(3); IOWA CT. R. 45.4(3); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.15(f) (West 2014); OR. RULES PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15-2(c) (West 2014); VA. SUP. CT. R.
pt. 6, § 4(B).
38. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(k); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.15(c)(2)(i) (West 2014); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6212(b); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.15(h)(3)(A) (West 2014); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(h) (West 2014);
D.C. BAR R. XI, § 20(f) (West 2014); FLA. ST. BAR R. 5-1.1(g)(5)(A); GA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.15(II)(c)(2)(iv) (West 2014); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 11(c)(1)(D)(i); IDAHO BAR COMM’N
R. 1306(b) (West 2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f) (West 2014); IND. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(5) (West 2014); KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(g)(2)
(West 2014); KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830(4); LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(g)(2) (West
2014); ME. BAR R. 6(a)(4)(C)(2); MD. CT. R. 16-610(b)(1)(D); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07(g)(i)
(LexisNexis 2015); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a)(2) (West 2014); MINN. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(o) (West 2014); MO. BAR R. 4-1.145(a)(5) (West 2014); MONT.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c)(1)(D) (West 2014); NEB. CT. R. 1.15; NEV. SUP. CT. R. §
3-903(B)(4); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 50(1)(B); N.J. CT. R. 1:28A-2(e)(1); N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3)
(LexisNexis 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 21, § 7000.9; N.C. BAR ch. 1, subch. D.,
§ .1317; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.10(A)(2) (West 2014); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.15(h)(2); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(o)(3); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
1.15(f)(5); S.C. SUP. CT. R. 412(c)(2)(A); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(3)(iv)
(2014); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 43, § 2 (West 2014); TEX. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. R. 7(a) (West
2014); UTAH BAR R. 14-1001(f)(1); VT. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15B(a) (West 2014);
WASH. RULES FOR ENF’T OF LAW. CONDUCT R. 15.7(e)(1) (West 2014); WIS. SUP. CT. R.
20:1.15(cm)(4)(b) (West 2014); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15A(b)(1) (LexisNexis
2015).

734

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:729

states followed thereafter.39 The language of California’s rule is representative
of comparability provisions nationwide and mandates that “the rate of interest
or dividends payable on any IOLTA account shall not be less than the interest
rate or dividends generally paid by the eligible institution to nonattorney
customers on accounts of the same type meeting the same minimum balance and
other eligibility requirements as the IOLTA account.”40
While rate comparability provisions ensure that IOLTA accounts earn at least
as much as their counterpart non-IOLTA accounts, they do not afford IOLTA
accounts the limited special protections guaranteed by other minimum ratesetting rules.41 IOLTA accounts are subject to the same prevailing rate
conditions that affect deposit accounts generally.42 A variety of factors influence
deposit rates and, therefore, banks’ rate-setting decisions.43 Depository banks
earn the majority of their income from net interest income, which is the
difference between the interest borrowers pay to the bank and the interest the
banks pay to depositors.44 The difference between the average interest rate the
bank charges borrowers and the average interest rate the bank pays depositors
constitutes the bank’s net interest margin.45 Banks strive to set interest rates that
will produce a healthy interest margin, but must adjust these rates in response to
the abundance or scarcity of deposits to fund loans as well as the availability and

39. Linda K. Rexer, The History of IOLTA, A.B.A. DIALOGUE MAG., http://apps.american
bar.org/legalservices/dialogue/su10/su10_iolta1.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2010) (giving a brief
overview of the evolution of IOLTA regulations).
40. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6212(b); see also CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.15(h)(3)(A) (“The eligible institution shall pay no less on its IOLTA accounts than the highest
interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers when
the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications
on its non-IOLTA accounts.”).
41. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (illustrating that IOLTA rules may require
IOLTA funds to earn rates comparable to non-IOLTA accounts without setting a specific minimum
interest rate).
42. See Rexer, supra note 39 (stating that Ohio’s rule requires lawyers to “hold IOLTA
accounts only in financial institutions that pay those accounts the same rates as accounts of nonIOLTA customers”).
43. See Laura Bruce, How Interest Rates Are Determined, BANKRATE.COM (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/cd/how-interest-rates-are-determined.aspx (“Interest rates are
affected by a number of factors. The Federal Reserve . . . raises and lowers short-term interest rates
in an effort to maintain . . . stability.”).
44. Robert DeYoung & Tara Rice, How Do Banks Make Money? The Fallacies of Fee
Income, ECON. PERSP., Nov. 2004, at 34, 34–35, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/
digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2004/ep_4qtr2004_part3_DeYoung_Rice.pdf
(“To be sure, the interest margin banks earn by intermediating between depositors and borrowers
continues to be the primary source of profits for most banking companies.”).
45. See id. at 34. This principle is illustrated in a classic banker’s joke: “According to the ‘36-3 rule,’ bankers paid a 3 percent rate of interest on deposits, charged a 6 percent rate of interest
on loans, and then headed to the golf course at 3 o’clock.” Id.
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demand for credit in the borrowing community.46 One of the many factors that
determine a bank’s interest rates is the behavior of the Federal Reserve in setting
central interest rates.47
Since the onset of the Financial Crisis, a principal objective of the Federal
Reserve has been to encourage economic activity by individuals and
businesses.48 A primary tool of this monetary policy has been to significantly
lower the rates at which most banks lend money.49 The Federal Reserve’s
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which determines monetary policy
in the United States, manages the Funds Target Rate (FFTR).50 According to
the FOMC, “monetary policy” comprises “the actions undertaken by a central
bank, such as the Federal Reserve, to influence the availability and cost of money
and credit to help promote national economic goals.”51 The FOMC, in
particular, is responsible for setting monetary policy through “open market
operations,”52 which are “the purchase and sale of securities in the open market
by a central bank,”53 and the FFTR is one of its principal tools.54
Although the FFTR has been set low to optimize economic growth and
stability, the extended low rates have had a direct impact on depositors’

46. See Bruce, supra note 43; see also Hesna Genay & Darrin R. Halcomb, Rising Interest
Rates, Bank Loans, and Deposits, CHI. FED. LETTER (The Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.),
Nov. 2008, at 1, 1–2, available at https://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/
chicago_fed_letter/2004/cflnovember2004_208.pdf (“Historically, rising interest rates have been
associated with slower growth of bank loans and deposits. . . . [And] higher interest rates can lead
to slower loan growth through their effects on deposits.”).
47. Bruce, supra note 43.
48. What Is The Fed: Monetary Policy, FED. RES. BD. S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/education/
teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/monetary-policy (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
49. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (showing a decline in Bank
Prime Loan Rates between 2008 and 2013). “The prime rate is a ‘reference or base rate’ that banks
use to set the price or interest rate on many of their commercial loans and some of their consumer
loan products.” What Is the Prime Rate, and Who Borrows at that Interest Rate?, FED. RES. BANK
S.F. (June 2005), http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2005/june/primeinterest-rate.
50. Open Market Operations, supra note 20; see also Mark F. Bernstein, The Federal Open
Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV.
111, 111 (1989) (“[T]he FOMC has complete control over the purchase and sale of government
securities by the Federal Reserve Banks, one of the chief instruments of monetary policy . . . .”).
51. About the FOMC, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). “The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave the
Federal Reserve responsibility for setting monetary policy.” Id.
52. Id.
53. Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_openmarketops.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2015).
54. About the FOMC, supra note 51.
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interest.55 Consequently, certain depositors who rely on interest income for
subsistence or retirement are adversely affected.56 The Wall Street Journal has
observed that the Federal Reserve’s extended strategy of maintaining a low
FFTR has produced disparate effects that may preserve the economic vitality of
certain sectors of the economy at the expense of certain individuals: “A long
spell of low interest rates has created a windfall worth billions to banks,
mortgage borrowers and others it was designed to benefit. But for many people
who were counting on their nest eggs, those same low rates can spell trouble.”57
Rate comparability rules mean that IOLTA accounts, like retirees, now face
the quandaries posed by sustained periods of low interest rates.58 The current
rate environment is unprecedented—from IOLTA’s inception in 1981 until
2008, the average prime rate, or rate at which banks typically lend to their most
creditworthy customers, ranged from 4.12% to 18.87%.59 By contrast, the
average prime rate has not surpassed 3.25% since 2009.60 In order for banks to
ensure a viable net interest margin during that time, they have in turn paid
interest rates that approach zero.61 IOLTA accounts under rate comparability
rules, which guarantee the rates offered to all depositors generally, have not been
exempt from these lower deposit interest rates.
2. Federal Funds Target Rate Provisions
As an alternative to pure rate comparability provisions, many states permit
participating banks to index their IOLTA rates directly to the FFTR.62 Instead

55. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also Mark Whitehouse, Fed’s Low
Interest Rates Crack Retirees’ Nest Eggs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703410604576216830941163492 (describing how the
Federal Reserve’s lowering of interest rates harms savers by reducing “income on investments”
and failing to “compensat[e] for inflation”).
56. Whitehouse, supra note 55.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, supra note 49 (showing historical data for Bank
Prime Loan Rates).
60. Id.
61. Maryland Consumer & Business Online Rates, BANK AM., https://www.bankof
america.com/deposits/bank-account-interest-rates.go (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (explaining that
Bank of America, for example, paid, as of October 18, 2014, three-hundredths of one percent on
Interest Checking account balances in excess of $100,000 in Maryland).
62. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(k) (2012); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.15(c)(2)(i) (West 2014); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(h)(3)(A) (West
2014); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(h) (West 2014); D.C. BAR R. XI, § 20(f) (West
2014); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 1306(b) (West 2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)
(West 2014); ME. BAR R. 6(a)(4)(C)(2) (West 2014); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.15(o) (West 2014); MO. BAR R. 4-1.145(a)(5) (West 2014); N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3)
(LexisNexis 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9 (2015); N.C. BAR ch. 1, subch.
D., § .1317(b)(3) (West 2014); S.C. SUP. CT. R. 412(c)(2)(A); UTAH BAR R. 14-1001(f)(1) (West
2014); WASH. RULES FOR ENF’T OF LAW. CONDUCT R. 15.7(e)(1) (West 2014).
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of focusing on the rates paid on other accounts, these states authorize banks to
use the FFTR as a basis for determining the minimum IOLTA interest rates to
be paid by eligible participating banks.63 A common formulation of this type of
rule gives banks the choice between paying a rate comparable to the rate offered
to non-IOLTA customers, or, instead, paying a rate based on the FFTR.64 Rate
rules that provide this option typically express the rate requirement as a
percentage of the FFTR; the percentage of the FFTR to be paid currently varies
by state from fifty-five percent to eighty percent of the FFTR.65
Some states pair FFTR-based interest rates with an absolute rate floor.66 In
Illinois, for example, “[a]s an alternative to the [rate comparability provision]
the financial institution may pay a ‘safe harbor’ yield equal to 70% of the Federal
Funds Target Rate or 1.0%, whichever is higher.”67 A safe harbor rate seeks to
ensure that actual interest rates paid on IOLTA accounts remain above a certain

63. See supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., IDAHO R. BAR. COMM. R. 1306. It states:
An eligible financial institution may satisfy the comparability requirements of subsection
(b) by electing one of the following options: (1) establish the IOLTA account as the
comparable rate product; (2) pay the comparable rate on the IOLTA account in lieu of
actually establishing the comparable rate or dividend product; or (3) pay a rate equal to
the greater of 70%, or such other rate as may be recommended by the Foundation, of the
Federal Fund Target Rate as of the first business day of the IOLTA account earnings
period, which rate is deemed to be net of allowable reasonable service charges or fees,
on an IOLTA account.
Id.
65. Compare N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3)(a)(iii) (“[E]ligible institutions [must] . . . pay an
amount on funds that would otherwise qualify for the investment options noted in Subparagraph
(c) of Subparagraph (3) of this paragraph equal to fifty-five percent (55%) of the federal funds
targeted rate as of the first business day of the month or other IOLTA remitting period . . . .”), with
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(o)(3) (“An approved eligible financial institution must
pay no less on IOLTA accounts than (i) the highest earnings rate generally available from the
institution to its non-IOLTA customers on each IOLTA account . . . or, (ii) 80% of the Federal
Funds Target Rate on all its IOLTA accounts.”).
66. See CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(3)(A); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(1)(C); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(4); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9(b)(1)–(2); N.C. BAR R. ch. 1, subch. D. § 1317(b)(3); S.C. APP. CT. R.
412; TEX. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. R. 7(a)(3); WASH. RULES FOR ENF’T LAW. CONDUCT R.
15.7(e)(1)(iii). In particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court amended its IOLTA rules to pair a rate
floor with its FFTR percentage rule, citing to economic circumstances that projected the FFTR to
remain at 0.00%. Supplemental Administrative Determination, Regarding IOLTA and the Best
Customer Standard, N.J. SUP. CT., Feb. 18, 2009.
67. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(4).
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minimum.68 Other states offer slight variations or limitations on this type of rate
rule.69
Because it is a monetary policy tool set by the Federal Reserve, the FFTR,
which controls IOLTA interest under these rules, is inherently subject to change
over time.70 Since the end of 2008, however, the rate has remained historically
anomalous—and low.71 As economic crisis loomed in late 2007, the FOMC
began a series of dramatic cuts to the FFTR, and set a “near-zero target rate” for
the FFT toward the end of 2008.72 This rate target was the lowest ever set,73 and
has remained static since 2008.74
The Federal Reserve has employed other strategies to bolster the economy,
including a “quantitative easing” strategy of purchasing United States Treasury
securities to keep borrowing costs low.75 In October 2014, six years after
introducing the strategy, the Federal Reserve announced that the progress of the
country’s economic recovery was sufficient to discontinue quantitative easing,76
but it does not appear to have changed its FFTR strategy.77 Although the FOMC
has recently commented on positive economic trends that signal a future change
in this policy, it stated “that it plans to keep short-term interest rates low for a
‘considerable’ time.”78
Because rates are expected to remain low for a considerable time, IOLTA
deposit rates based on the FFTR are likely to remain low as well. In turn, legal
68. See Approved IOLTA Depositories, MASS. IOLTA, http://www.maiolta.org/financial/
depositories.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2014) (stating that banks “choosing the Safe Harbor rate
are helping to meet the legal needs of Massachusetts residents by insuring their rate maintains a
minimum level at all times and increases with other market rates”).
69. See, e.g., NEV. SUP. CT. R. 217(2) (West 2014). Nevada’s formulation is a slight variation
that allows banks to pay a minimum rate “[e]qual to the Federal Fund Target Rate, or, the Federal
Discount Rate plus .50 percent.” Id. Kentucky allows banks the option to pay IOLTA interest at
the rate of seventy percent of the FFTR, but only if the FFTR is between one and four percent. KY.
SUP. CT. R. 3.830(5) (West 2014).
70. See Open Market Operations, supra note 20 (showing the fluctuation in historical
FFTRs).
71. Id. (indicating that FFTRs since “late 2008” represent historic lows for an extended period
of time).
72. Id. The rationale for this rate setting policy is further discussed in Part I.B.2
73. Neil Irwin, Fed Cuts Key Rate to Record Low, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121601754.html.
74. Open Market Operations, supra note 20.
75. Binyamin Appelbaum, Federal Reserve Caps Its Bond Purchases; Focus Turns to Interest
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/business/federal-reservejanet-yellen-qe-announcement.html; see also Brett W. Fawley & Luciana Juvenal, Quantitative
Easing: Lessons We’ve Learned, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, July 2012, at 8, available at
https://www.stlouisfed.org/legacy_assets/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2012/c/QE.pdf.
76. Appelbaum, supra note 75.
77. Alain Sherter, Moneywatch: Fed Vows to Keep Interest Rates Low for “Considerable”
Time, CBS MONEYWATCH (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fedvows-to-keep-interest-rates-low-for-considerable-time.
78. Id.
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aid programs that rely on IOLTA interest income face diminished funding.79 Yet
with few exceptions, state IOLTA organizations have not changed IOLTA rules
in response to static, low interest rates. 80
C. Factors Affecting Eligible Bank Participation
Banks are an indispensable part of the IOLTA program: they create attorneys’
IOLTA accounts, accept and account for deposits made to the accounts,
calculate and credit interest earned, and pay that interest to the appropriate legal
aid organization.81 Bank participation, however, is not mandatory.82 Instead,
the terms governing eligibility to offer IOLTA accounts are contained in the
rules promulgated by the relevant rulemaking authority in each state.83 IOLTA
rules typically refer to such banks as “participating,” 84 “eligible,” or “approved”
institutions.85 The basis for this institutional eligibility differs by state. For
example, in North Dakota and Rhode Island, any bank that does business in the
respective state is eligible to participate in IOLTA.86 Some states, such as
Oregon and Vermont, have IOLTA rules that condition a bank’s eligibility on
the execution of an explicit agreement that the bank reports certain types of
transaction activity on an IOLTA account.87 But the most common provision,

79. Robert J. Derocher, The IOLTA Crash: Fallout for Foundations, A.B.A. BAR LEADER,
Sept.–Oct. 2012, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/2012_13/
september_october/iolta_crash_fallout_foundations.html (last visited September 14, 2014).
80. The New Jersey Supreme Court revised its IOLTA rate comparability rule in 2009, noting
that “[i]n light of the ‘floating’ Federal Funds Target Rate being grounded at 0.00%, there is a need
for immediate action to assist banks seeking guidance about how to meet the Best Customer [rate
comparability] Standard.” Supplemental Administrative Determination, Regarding IOLTA and the
Best Customer Standard, N.J. SUP. CT. (Feb. 18, 2009). The Kentucky rule, which only permits
banks to use the FFTR as a rate-setting guide when the FFTR is between one and four percent,
would not allow a bank to rely on that provision today. See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830(5).
81. See Derocher, supra note 79 (explaining how few states have found success in changing
how IOLTA programs are funded).
82. See Info for Banks, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/info-for-banks (last visited Sept.
18, 2014).
83. See supra Part I.A.
84. See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830(3)–(5).
85. See DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(12)(A) (West 2014).
86. See N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(4) (West 2014) (“An eligible financial
institution is a bank, savings bank, trust company, savings and loan association, savings association,
credit union, or federally regulated investment company authorized by federal or state law to do
business in North Dakota and insured by [the proper relevant body].”); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.15(f)(4) (West 2014) (“IOLTA accounts may be established with any financial
institution authorized by federal or state law to do business in Rhode Island.”).
87. See VT. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15B(d) (West 2014) (stating that eligible banks
must “notify Disciplinary Counsel whenever (1) any properly payable instrument is presented
against such a trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the
instrument is honored; and (2) whenever any transaction, no matter the type, causes such an account
to be overdrawn”).
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by far, requires banks to comply with established rate comparability rules in
order to maintain their status as eligible institutions.88
Although banks are not obligated by rule to participate as IOLTA depository
institutions, there are incentives for bank participation:
[F]inancial institutions receive a benefit under the IOLTA system
(since they can utilize the funds at a higher rate of return than the
interest paid to the nonprofit organization) . . . . As there is strong
competition between financial institutions, it is likely that institutions
not offering IOLTA type accounts will totally lose use of the funds
because lawyers will move accounts to institutions providing such
services.89
In addition, participation in IOLTA programs earns banks Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit, which is an important factor in determining a
bank’s eligibility to expand in certain markets or participate in a merger or
acquisition.90
Nothing in the IOLTA rules prohibits any institution from paying a rate higher
than that guaranteed by a state’s minimum IOLTA rate provisions. Highlighting
the competition of deposits described above, many state IOLTA programs and
bar associations provide special recognition to institutions that offer interest
rates for IOLTA accounts that are higher than the minimum rate prescribed by
the rules.91 This recognition encourages attorneys to reward these “honor roll”
banks by choosing to house their IOLTA accounts and other business with the
banks.92
Oregon and Texas, for example, are two states with IOLTA programs that
have taken an active and organized approach to encourage banks to pay higher
than minimum interest rates on IOLTA accounts.93 The Oregon Law
88. See supra Part I.B.1.
89. Betsy Borden Johnson, “With Liberty and Justice for All”: IOLTA in Texas—The Texas
Equal Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 725, 727 (1985).
90. See Thom Weidlich, IOLTAs Can Be Good Way to Build Deposits, AM. BANKER (June 7,
2004, 5:48 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/special-reports/169_16/-223736-1.html; see
also About Us: Community Reinvestment Act, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://www.stlouisfed.
org/community_development/cra.cfm#main (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (“An institution’s record
of meeting the credit needs . . . is taken into consideration . . . when [it] seeks to expand through
merger acquisition or branching.”).
91. See, e.g., Info for Banks, supra note 82 (“Many IOLTA programs publicly recognize
financial institutions that treat IOLTA favorably. Some states have an ‘Honor Roll’ for financial
institutions, and other states provide different forms of recognition. Several states also present
awards at bar association functions . . . .”).
92. See, e.g., Information for Lawyers, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.oregonlawfoundation.org/
lawyers.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (“You can help the Oregon Law Foundation by
establishing your IOLTA account at (or moving your IOLTA account to) a bank that is committed
to maximizing the rate of return on IOLTA accounts. The Oregon Law Foundation’s ‘Leadership
Banks’ have shown such a commitment.”).
93. Ken Smith et al., Partnership Bank Programs: Maximizing IOLTA Revenue in Difficult
Times, A.B.A. DIALOGUE MAG., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
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Foundation’s “Leadership Bank” program provides special recognition and
benefits to banks that voluntarily paid higher rates on IOLTA accounts.94 As of
2012, it boasted bank participation that included “one out of every three Oregon
banks” and “five of [the] 10 biggest banks.”95 The effect of this participation
was that “69[%] of all IOLTA deposits are in . . . [b]anks, paying [an] average
net yield of 0.71[%] compared with . . . 0.10[%] estimated yield that these banks
pay their non IOLTA customers holding comparable accounts.”96
The Texas Access to Justice Foundation (TAJF) implemented its “Prime
Partners” program in 2007 to attract and reward banks paying higher IOLTA
rates.97 As in Oregon, participating banks in Texas paid at least one percent
interest on IOLTA accounts, and earned special recognition and benefits.98 In
2012, TAJF said that additional IOLTA revenue attributable to the higher rates
paid by its “Prime Partner” banks was $1.5 million, which “is sufficient to fund
30 additional legal aid lawyers at the national average salary of $50,000 per
year.”99
Many large national banks do not elect to compete for IOLTA deposits by
offering higher rates than those required by rule, but still manage to retain a large
share of the overall IOLTA market.100 Despite its previous recognition of

dialogue/ls_dial_su12_iolta1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited April 9, 2015) (“The Leadership Bank
program has achieved its goal of maximizing IOLTA revenue while also maintaining the excellent
working partnership of the banking and legal communities. It builds on the positive banking
relationships that Oregon IOLTA has developed through its sustained efforts over many years.”).
94. Id. These benefits are summarized on the website of the Oregon Law Foundation:
Participation in IOLTA can be seen as a community service by banks and can result in
favorable coverage by the media. Since Oregon lawyers are committed to access to
justice issues and funding, some financial institutions in Oregon use their IOLTA
accounts as a way to attract new customers. In addition, the Oregon Law Foundation
will promote among attorneys the patronage of financial institutions in which IOLTA
accounts will generate funds for legal services to the poor, including assisting attorneys
in locating Leadership Banks in their area.
Info for Banks, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.oregonlawfoundation.org/banks.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2014).
95. Smith et al., supra note 93.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. In its pitch to obtain involvement of Texas banks,
TAJF crafted a bold proposition: Pay more than required under comparability and your
bank will be highly publicized in the legal community as a “Prime Partner,” willing to
comply and to go above and beyond for the benefit of low income people who need
access to our civil justice system.
Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Beverly Michaelis, Speak up for IOLTA – Tell U.S. Bank What You Think, OR.
L. PRAC. MGMT. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://oregonlawpracticemanagement.com/2011/08/01/speak-upfor-iolta-tell-us-bank-what-you-think/ (“U.S. Bank holds more IOLTA accounts in Oregon than
any other banking institution.”).
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successful efforts to build large bank participation,101 the Oregon Legal
Foundation noted that “U.S. Bank . . . [is] decreasing its IOLTA interest rate
from 0.7% to a tiered average of 0.13%. This decrease . . . will result in a [twenty
percent] loss in annual IOLTA revenue or $160,000 for 2014.”102 Big bank
participation in the Texas “Prime Partners” program also diminished at the onset
of the Financial Crisis.103 Other banks may avoid or reconsider participation in
IOLTA based on rate considerations. In 2010, JP Morgan Chase ended its
participation in the New Jersey IOLTA program because it did not wish to
comply with rate comparability provisions.104
D. Diminishing IOLTA Revenues After 2007 and State Responses
Because IOLTA program revenues ordinarily tend to fluctuate in concert with
the central interest rates set by the Federal Reserve,105 the IOLTA program is a
procyclical phenomenon that tends to mirror the overall strength of the
American economy.106 As a result of the Federal Reserve’s ongoing efforts to
keep borrowing rates low, and banks’ ensuing action to lower interest rates to
preserve net interest margins, IOLTA interest revenues rapidly declined after
2007 and remain at historic lows.107 This phenomenon has been widely
recognized by the legal community, which has felt its practical effect over the
last six years: when interest rates are depressed for extended periods of time,
reduced IOLTA revenues affect the delivery of legal aid services that rely on
IOLTA revenues.108 The effect is further compounded by the inherent risk of
volatility caused by related economic factors, such as the relative strength of the
housing market.109

101. See Smith et al., supra note 93 (“Oregon’s program demonstrates that these relationships
can even be forged with large banks like Wells Fargo and US Bank that hold the bulk of IOLTA
deposits.”).
102. President’s Report in 2013 Annual Report, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.
oregonlawfoundation.org/docs/OLFAR.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
103. See Smith et al., supra note 93 (“After the Fed Rate dropped to near zero, three of the five
biggest banks dropped out of the program.”).
104. Brian T. Murray, N.J. Attorneys, Law Firms Pull Client Trust Accounts Held by Chase,
N.J. STAR LEDGER (August 2, 2010, 8:54 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2010/
08/attorneys_pulling_client_trust.html.
105. See Chris Tweeten, Legal Services Needs Your Help, MONT. LAW., April 2009, at 4,
available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.montanabar.org/resource/collection/EAA30F23-476749DA-BBE7-152CF93C8535/April2009MTLawyer.pdf (noting how IOLTA funds are reduced as
the Federal Reserve’s “benchmark interest rate” falls).
106. Carter, supra note 5.
107. Id. Interest Rates, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta/items-interest-rates
(last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
108. Id.; see also Kathleen A. McKee, The Impact of the Current Economy on Access to
Justice, 62 ME. L. REV. 613, 629 n.38 (2010) (explaining how interest rate reductions led to a drop
in the projected funding for legal services to the underprivileged in Virginia).
109. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 465–66. Stevenson explains that:
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The extent of IOLTA revenue reduction is remarkable. “In Texas, IOLTA
revenue has dropped from $20 million in 2007 to an estimated $4.4 million in
2012—an 80 percent decline.”110 The District of Columbia Bar Foundation
reported that between 2008 and 2014, its IOLTA revenue fell from
approximately $2.4 million to $539,898, despite a net increase of over 700
accounts.111 Florida, a state hit hard by the Financial Crisis, saw “IOLTA
revenue tumble 88[%] over the last five years, from $44 million to $5.5
million.”112
States have been affected by IOLTA rate declines in varying degrees, but
“layoffs, salary cuts, and office closures for organizations providing civil legal
services to the poor continue to unfold across the country,” as legal aid providers
face mounting demand and shriveling IOLTA funds.113 According to the
American Bar Association (ABA) statistics, in just the first four years of the
recession, “IOLTA grants to legal service providers nationwide from 2008 to
2011[] plung[ed] from $231 million to $106 million.”114
The procyclical nature of IOLTA rates and program funding tends to suggest
that rates and revenue can be expected to be at their lowest when the overall
health of the economy is at its poorest.115 Additionally, there is evidence that
demand for legal services remains the same or even increases when the economy
is relatively weak, and legal aid funding from IOLTA is depressed; for example,
“South Jersey Legal Services, which covers seven counties, will lay off five
attorneys and close two offices beginning in January.” 116 As a result, “[i]t

[M]ost IOLTA deposits are from real estate transactions, so a downturn in the real estate
market means fewer IOLTA deposits to generate interest. Depressed property values
shrink the size of the IOLTA deposits that do come in, further depleting the funds. Many
IOLTA programs try to mitigate these problems by having the entity that receives and
distributes the funds engage in regular charitable fundraising and apply for grants from
other private foundations or government entities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
110. Derocher, supra note 79. According to Derocher, state IOLTA resources have been
decimated: “Less than five years after receiving $1.9 million in IOLTA revenue, the Boston Bar
Foundation . . . [received] $600,000 in IOLTA funds in 2011—a nearly 70 percent decline. The
Montana Justice Foundation, which received $1 million via IOLTA in 2007, expects just $160,000
in such revenue in 2012-13.” Id.
111. Catherine Ho, D.C. IOLTA Program Struggles Amid Low Interest Rates, WASH. POST
(Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/dc-iolta-programstruggles-amid-low-interest-rates/2014/09/05/d769c672-33b7-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.
html.
112. Derocher, supra note 79.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Matt Katz, Financial Crisis Harms Legal Aid for N.J. Poor, States Facing Deep Fund
Shortage, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 27, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-09-27/news/25247
143_1_legal-aid-interest-rates-housing-market.
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expects to provide legal help to 9,000 people next year, down from 12,000 this
year.”117
Some legal aid programs that typically rely on IOLTA have been able to find
other sources of income to offset the impact of rate reductions. The Maryland
Legal Services Corporation, for example, was able to partially offset a fifteen
percent reduction in IOLTA revenue in 2013 by successfully petitioning the
legislature for court filing fees and increased allocation from other state funds.118
In 2009, Texas’ TAJF successfully petitioned the state legislature for $20 million
in funding that year.119 In Alabama, where IOLTA revenues to the Alabama
Law Foundation declined by sixty-two percent between 2008 and 2014,
attorneys were encouraged to make a fifty-dollar, tax-deductible contribution in
conjunction with the payment of annual assessments to the Client Security
Fund.120
The Department of Justice’s recent settlement with Bank of America, in the
wake of an investigation into mortgage-backed securities, requires Bank of
America to pay $30 million into IOLTA programs across the country,
representing a significant windfall for these programs.121 In some states, “cy
pres” awards, or “residual funds from class actions[,] [are] now given wholly or
partially to legal services.”122 For instance, in 2010, “Texas’ IOLTA . . .
received $2.6 million [from] cy pres funds,” and “$1.38 million in cy pres cash
flowed into the Montana Justice Foundation.”123
Despite these attempts to obtain alternative sources of funding, IOLTA
programs continue to struggle under depressed interest rates.124 Until IOLTA
account revenues increase, state legal aid programs will need to continue

117. Id.
118. See, e.g., MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2013), available at
http://mlsc.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/MLSC_AR2013.pdf (noting that despite these
additional income sources, Maryland’s operating grants were cut by five percent). Maryland’s
IOLTA income for 2013 was $2.1 million, compared to $6.4 million in IOLTA revenues in 2007.
Id.; see also MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2007), available
at http://www.mlsc.org/2007AnnualReport.pdf (describing 2007 IOLTA revenues).
119. Carter, supra note 5.
120. Alabama Law Foundation Added to Client Security Fund Statement, ALA. L. FOUND.,
http://www.alabamalawfoundation.org/2014/03/25/alabama-law-foundation-contribution-addedto-client-security-fund-statement/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). Reductions in funding to the
Alabama Law Foundation “forced [it] to cut grants to the Volunteer Lawyers Programs, Legal
Services Alabama and other grantees by 20%.” Id. Additionally, Alabama’s “five Volunteer
Lawyers Programs had already received cuts of 40% in Legal Services Corporation funding.” Id.
121. Catherine Ho, Legal Aid Groups to Get $30 Million from Bank Settlement, WASH. POST
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/legal-aid-groups-toget30-million-from-bank-settlement/2014/08/27/8b0cbc96-2d61-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.
html.
122. Carter, supra note 5.
123. Id.
124. Derocher, supra note 79.
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identifying alternative funding sources to supplement their revenues or face
reductions to their programs.125
II. THE EXTRAORDINARY ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS REVEALED THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT IOLTA RULES
A. They Never Saw It Coming
When states first began to adopt IOLTA rules, they did so in an economic
environment that was markedly different than the present.126 In the twenty-five
years preceding Florida’s implementation of the first IOLTA program in 1981,
the average prime lending rate was over seven percent.127 After 1981, the prime
rate remained at least six percent in every year until 2002.128
In 1997, when Indiana finally adopted IOLTA, the last state in the country to
do so, the average net interest margin at United States banks was above four
percent.129 The average interest paid on a one-month certificate of deposit
between 1981 and 1999 was over seven percent.130 Net interest margins
remained above 3.75% until 2003.131 In these conditions, it would be reasonable
to expect that IOLTA deposits would earn more than a nominal rate of return. It
was in this stable and ordinary economic climate that IOLTA rules were
adopted, with rate-setting language that reflected the market at the time of
adoption.132
With the most severe economic catastrophe of the twentieth century, the Great
Depression, forty years in the past, it is likely that the states did not foresee
another sustained period of economic recession or imagine how a recession
might have such a profound effect on IOLTA programs. But the current
recession shows how IOLTA’s rate rules, which worked so well in ordinary
times, have done little to ensure consistent delivery of IOLTA revenues to legal
aid programs.133

125. Katz, supra note 116; see also Derocher, supra note 79.
126. See Carter, supra note 5; Derocher, supra note 79.
127. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, supra note 49.
128. Id. Rates remained between four percent and five percent until 2005, when average prime
rates rose again to over six percent.
129. Net Interest Margin for All U.S. Banks, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNIM (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Information for
Participating Financial Institutions, IND. BAR FOUND., http://www.inbf.org/IOLTA/
InformationforFinancialInstitutions/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited April 9, 2015).
130. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, supra note 49.
131. Net Interest Margin for All U.S. Banks, supra note 129.
132. See supra Part I.B.1; see also supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part I.D.
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B. Current IOLTA Rules Permit Federal Monetary Policy to Undermine the
Just Ideals of IOLTA
There is no question that the purpose of IOLTA programs, to provide funding
for legal aid services, is clear.134 But the rate rules, read in light of the current
interest rate environment, beg the question: was IOLTA income intended to be
a stable and sustainable source of support for needy citizens seeking access to
justice in all economic conditions, or was it simply a charitable allocation to be
made when the Federal Reserve sets interest rates high enough? While focusing
on the nation’s big-picture economic woes, the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy has unintentionally decimated IOLTA revenue—at a time when demand
for legal aid is likely at its highest.135
The broad acceptance of IOLTA’s mission, to provide legal assistance to the
neediest Americans, supports the idea that IOLTA interest rates should not be
tied to a monetary policy capable of radically lowering deposit rates.136 The
vigor with which IOLTA was implemented and defended against constitutional
challenges, tends to suggest that the legal community, as well as the sanctioning
states, not only believe strongly in the underlying program purpose, but also
have an interest in the IOLTA rate mechanisms themselves.137 Rate setting
provisions based on FFTR, which result in an IOLTA rate floor, may also imply
the states’ intent to specifically protect IOLTA accounts.138
Banks may reasonably counter that there is an inherent logic in keeping
IOLTA rates in lockstep with the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, rather than
using some independent rate setting methodology. After all, the FFTR does not
simply reflect market interest rate conditions, but actually influences them.139
Furthermore, unless a bank decides to lend at higher interest rates than the
134. See supra Part I.A.
135. See supra Part I.D. Tragically, as Derocher notes, “the funding downturn came at a time
of reduced federal aid to legal aid programs, coupled with increased public demand for such
services from people facing unemployment, home foreclosure, and related economic crises.”
Derocher, supra note 79.
136. See supra Part I.A. It took only sixteen years to implement it in all fifty states after Florida
implemented the first IOLTA program in 1971. Petition of N.H. Bar Ass’n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1259
(N.H. 1982).
137. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 466 (2010) (discussing appellate court challenges to
IOLTA in Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163 (1998); Washington Legal Found. v.
Legal Found. of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Legal
Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice
Found., 94 F.3d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1996); Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962,
968–69 (1st Cir. 1993); Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1003 (11th Cir. 1987)). For
instance, the Ninth Circuit, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington,
noted that the “change from the tradition that no interest was obtained from lawyers’ trust
accounts,” occurred because “in the 1970’s, interest rates reached unprecedented high levels.”
Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 868–69.
138. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
139. Federal Open Market Committee, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
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prevailing competitive market rates, it likely cannot afford to pay higher interest
rates without compressing its net interest margin—its largest source of income—
or finding another way to offset the higher interest paid to IOLTA.140 A
declining net interest margin could adversely impact banks with less diversified
sources of revenue, particularly smaller banks.141
Bank performance data, however, does not suggest that interest margin
compression has made it impossible for banks to afford paying higher IOLTA
rates.142 Because the FFTR is both a descriptive and prescriptive monetary
policy tool that addresses macroeconomic factors that extend beyond the
financial services sector of the economy,143 bank performance (unlike IOLTA
rates) does not move in lockstep with the FFTR.144 In fact, many banks, despite
a completely static federal monetary policy, have shown positive financial
performance trends since 2008.145 Even if one takes the conservative position
that IOLTA interest rates should be predicated on the banks’ capacities to afford
them, this financial performance data tends to support a conclusion that bank
profitability, rather than Federal Reserve rates, is a more accurate measure of
what rates banks can afford to pay.146

140. See DeYoung & Rice, supra note 44, at 35 (explaining how most banks’ interest margins
are their primary source of profits).
141. See A Quick Comparison Of Interest Margins For The Largest U.S. Banks, FORBES (Sept.
11, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/09/11/a-quick-com
parison-of-interest-margins-for-the-largest-u-s-banks/ (explaining that banks without diverse
revenue streams have suffered greater losses from contracting interest rates than their more
diversified competitors).
142. See JAN SCHILDACH & CLAUDIUS WENZEL, BANK PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. AND
EUROPE: AN OCEAN APART 7 (2013), available at https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/
DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000320825.pdf. The bank performance data shows
that:
US banks’ revenues—though lacking meaningful growth—have constantly been above
pre-crisis levels in recent years. Despite suffering from a decline in the interest margin
of late, net interest income is still substantially higher than before the onset of the crisis,
thanks to lower funding costs and, more recently, increased portfolios of debt securities
and an uptick in lending volumes . . . .
Id.
143. See Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm (last updated Oct. 8,
2014). The Committee’s broad assessment includes all aspects of the economy, such as labor,
capital markets, and housing. Id.
144. Compare SCHILDACH & WENZEL, supra note 142, at 3 (showing that U.S. bank
performance has improved markedly since 2008), with Open Market Operations, supra note 20
(showing that the FFTR has been essentially flat and near zero since the end of 2008).
145. See SCHILDACH & WENZEL, supra note 142, at 3.
146. See id. at 1, 7 (noting that U.S. banks are experiencing “stable revenues that are
significantly above pre-crisis levels”); Smith et al., supra note 93 (acknowledging that Texas’
“Prime Partners banks” paid more than the “safe harbor” rate on IOLTA accounts (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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C. Current IOLTA Rules Do Not Provide Consistent, Logical Incentives for
Participating Banks
Every bank that participates in IOLTA derives at least two benefits: first, the
deposits themselves provide banks funding to make loans and generate interest
income; and, second, opening an IOLTA account provides opportunities for
contact between the attorneys and the banks, which affords the banks the
opportunity to earn profitable non-IOLTA business from the attorneys.147
However, assuming all other factors are equal, banks offering higher-thanminimum rates experience higher costs in deriving these benefits because those
banks would theoretically expect a lower net interest margin unless they charged
higher interest rates on loans—potentially making it a less attractive place to do
business.148
The rules governing bank participation in IOLTA programs have created a
curious state of affairs. “Honor roll[s]” published by state bar associations and
legal aid corporations recognize banks that elect to voluntarily pay higher rates
on IOLTA accounts.149 However, the names of the largest national banks do not
consistently appear on these lists.150 The listed banks are most often local or
regional banks rather than large national banks.151 Although large banks
participate in IOLTA, they often pay only the minimum rates necessary to
participate under state IOLTA rules.152 However, despite this tendency to pay
lower IOLTA rates, big banks may still control a predominant share of the

147. Johnson, supra note 89, at 727 (stating that banks “can utilize [IOLTA] funds at a higher
rate of return than the interest paid to the nonprofit [legal aid] organization,” and competition
between banks makes it “likely that institutions not offering IOLTA type accounts will totally lose
use of the [the nonprofits] funds because lawyers will move accounts to institutions providing such
services”).
148. See DeYoung & Rice, supra note 44, at 34, 38, 40–42 (explaining how despite the
increasing rate of noninterest income in bank profits, banks still heavily rely on interest-based
accounts).
149. See, e.g., IOLTA Honor Roll, MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://mlsc.org/iolta-honor-roll/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014) (listing the banks on Maryland’s “IOLTA Honor Roll”).
150. See, e.g., id.; NC IOLTA Eligible Bank List, N.C. IOLTA, http://www.nciolta.com/
iolta_banklist.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (recognizing ten banks in North Carolina paying a
higher IOLTA rate: Albemarle Bank & Trust, Bank of North Carolina, Bank of Oak Ridge, Coastal
Bank & Trust, LifeStore Bank, Macon Bank, Old Town Bank, Providence Bank, Roxboro Savings
Bank, and Towne Bank).
151. See, e.g., supra note 150.
152. See, e.g., IOLTA Honor Roll, supra note 149 (showing that HSBC Bank USA is the only
national bank that “agreed to pay a net yield of the greater of [one percent] or [sixty-five percent]
or more of the federal funds target rate on IOLTA deposits”). While some large national banks
elect to pay a higher IOLTA rate, they may not choose to do so consistently across all markets;
Wells Fargo Bank pays at least one percent on IOLTA accounts in Oregon, but not in Maryland.
Compare Where You Bank Matters, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.oregonlawfoundation.org/
docs/LeadershipBanks.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), with IOLTA Honor Roll, supra note 149
(declining to list Wells Fargo on Maryland’s “IOLTA Honor Roll”).
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IOLTA deposits in some states.153 This could reduce the potential revenue
impact of IOLTA funds statewide.154
Counterintuitively, the current rules permit large banks to derive the principal
advantages of IOLTA participation—deposit funding and opportunities to
obtain and retain attorneys’ business—while often paying the lowest IOLTA
rates required by rule.155 Smaller banks, which often pay a higher IOLTA rate
than the minimum required by state rules,156 bear a higher interest expense
burden without enjoying a tangible competitive advantage.157
III. IOLTA REGULATIONS NEED, AND DESERVE, TEETH
Since 2008, the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve has exposed an
obvious flaw in the rules that govern IOLTA programs. The FFTR, a useful tool
in governing macroeconomic monetary policy and access to credit, is not a
sensible basis to determine the funding of IOLTA programs. By making IOLTA
interest rates dependent on rates set by the Federal Reserve, states have
guaranteed that income from IOLTA programs will, at best, be unpredictable.
At worst, IOLTA revenues will be depressed during sustained periods of
economic difficulty—periods when the need for legal aid funding tends to
increase. Either scenario presents a challenge to the funding and administration
of state legal aid programs. States have employed stopgap approaches to
alternative funding instead of considering rule changes that would substantially
bolster, or at least stabilize, IOLTA interest revenues.158 But many of these
stopgap measures, such as legislative grants or additional court filing fees, shift
the burden of legal aid funding from banks to the public.
The simplest proposed rule change is to tighten the terms of banks
participation in IOLTA programs without prescribing any actual changes to rate
setting provisions of the controlling rules. Because banks are free to determine
whether they participate in IOLTA, and whether to offer a higher rate than
mandated by the state rules, state IOLTA programs should develop bank
participation standards that reward banks that choose to voluntarily pay a higher
rate of interest than the rate paid to comparable non-IOLTA accounts.159 The
rulemaking authority in each state should revise participation standards to
require that banks pay an “honor roll” rate in order to offer IOLTA account
services.
153. See Smith et al., supra note 93; see also Michaelis, supra note 100 (noting that U.S. Bank
holds the greatest number of Oregon’s IOLTA accounts).
154. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part I.C.
156. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
158. See Katz, supra note 116 (discussing alterations Pennsylvania made to IOLTA rules to
address the low interest rate effects).
159. See Smith et al., supra note 93 (explaining how Oregon banks can obtain benefits paying
higher returns on IOLTA accounts).
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By limiting provision of IOLTA services exclusively to banks that voluntarily
pay higher IOLTA interest rates, two beneficial outcomes may occur. First, the
resulting participant banks will attain a larger deposit base not only through
IOLTA accounts, but also through the commercial deposits of attorneys who use
them.160 If larger national banks determine that IOLTA deposits are a necessary
part of their business, then they would have to pay a higher rate, and bear an
equivalent burden to obtain them. Second, limiting participation to banks that
pay an established rate will ensure that legal aid revenues, which are supported
by IOLTA interest income, are not only higher than current levels, but also more
predictable in the future.161
Other proposals may address the minimum rate-setting rule directly. One idea
that would ensure the most consistent delivery of IOLTA revenues would be the
establishment of a fixed statutory rate similar to the fixed, flat rate established
by the optional Texas Prime Partners program.162 Legal aid services will benefit
from a far more predictable source of revenue each year, which will permit longterm planning and staffing.163 Banks also stand to benefit from a modest fixed
IOLTA rate. If, for example, a state set the IOLTA rate at one percent by rule,
banks would feel interest margin pressure for the near future; but years from
now, when prime lending rates rise again, a fixed IOLTA rate will actually
improve the net interest margin.164 Such a proposal stands in contrast to current
comparability provisions, and states need to address this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current IOLTA program is a noble idea, but its rules were not drafted to
ensure a consistent source of revenue through difficult economic conditions.
Instead, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, which is intended to repair
economic difficulties, adversely affects the interest income earned by IOLTA
programs. For as long as interest rates remain depressed, or if low rates persist
again in the future, legal aid programs that substantially rely on IOLTA will
continue to suffer.

160. See id.
161. See id. (explaining how Oregon’s “Leadership Banks program” provided greater IOLTA
funding predictability).
162. See, e.g., id. (discussing how Texas’ Prime Partners program sets “a flat 1.0[%]” rate for
its participants).
163. See id. (discussing the impact of the increased revenue from the Texas Prime Partners
program).
164. Because net interest margin is the difference between what a bank makes on loan interest
and what it pays on deposits, if a bank pays out more on IOLTA deposits under current interest
rates, its net interest margin would be squeezed. See Greg Edwards, Banks Face Continuing Net
Interest Margins Pressure, ST. LOUIS BIZ TALK (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/
stlouis/blog/2012/12/banks-face-continuing-net-interest.html (explaining how net interest margins
work). However, once the interest rates rise again, if the IOLTA accounts rates are set at a low
rate, the banks’ interest margin on the accounts will increase. See id.
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States have the authority to determine the rules of their respective IOLTA
plans and the terms of the banks’ participation. By updating the rules to plan for
economic volatility, or at least governing participation standards to reward
model bank behavior, states can continue to fulfill the vital mission of providing
legal aid services, particularly in sour economic climates, when they are most
needed.
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